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In 2010 many predicted that Britain’s first post-war coalition government would not last to 2015
and that it would be the Liberal Democrats who would break first. Tim Oliver discusses why the
party held on despite massive pressure, and what this can tell us about the performance of third
parties in coalition government.
In bygone days, commanders were taught that when in doubt they should march their
troops towards the sound of gunfire. I intend to march my troops towards the sound of
gunfire.
– Jo Grimond, Liberal leader, Liberal Assembly, 1963.
We have been graceful under fire… we have put country before party. 
– Nick Clegg, Liberal Democrat leader, BBC interview, 13 April 2015.
The formation of the coalition government in 2010 was accompanied by a stream of predictions that it would not
last to 2015. For many it would be the Liberal Democrats who would break first. Having been out of government
since 1945, the smallest of the UK’s three main parties stood accused of being inexperienced and unprepared
for the rigours of government.
Government has certainly taken its toll on the party. Having won 23 per cent of the national vote in 2010, with
‘Cleggmania’ briefly pushing the party above Labour in opinion polling, the party today finds its support
somewhere under 10 per cent. In the forthcoming 2015 general election the party may find its support collapses
to its lowest ever level reducing its number of MPs from 59 to a much lower number. In the 2014 European
Parliament elections the party, the most pro-European of the UK-wide parties, lost all but one of its eleven
MEPs. By 2015 the party had dropped to 2,257 councillors, down from just over 4,000 three years earlier. It has
only 5 MSPs, down from 17. Membership has dropped from an estimated 75,000 to 44,000. The party’s
achievements in government are often dismissed or ignored. To say that Nick Clegg is unpopular would be an
understatement; he may even lose his seat.
So why then did the party not quit the coalition or depose Nick Clegg? Was it because they had no alternative but
to follow orders and keep marching towards the sound of gunfire? Did they fear the consequences of being shot
of their captain? This is, let us remember, a party that was famed for a difficult – some said impossible – to lead
activist base, was proud of its democratic party decision making structures and which had shown no qualms
about deposing two leaders – Charles Kennedy and Ming Campbell – in quick succession.
The possibility of coalition (or minority) government looks set to become a norm of UK politics. Understanding the
deals by which coalitions are formed will only be part of the future study of UK government. Just as important will
be understanding coalitions as on-going relationships that change with time and are shaped by changes in trust
and perceptions of risk and opportunities. This applies not only to the relationship between coalition partners but
to those inside the parties.
What then can the UK’s experiences tell us about how coalition government endures and how the participating
parties hold on? Love or hate the 2010-2015 coalition, that it endured to the end shows that a lasting coalition
government is possible in peacetime. Analysing why the Liberal Democrats hung on and made concessions to
keep the coalition going will be key to understanding the coalition given they were the ones many thought would
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break first. Did they keep going for reasons to do with their own internal make-up and beliefs, or was there
something about the UK’s political system, and Westminster especially, that meant the smaller of the two
coalition partners had no option but to soldier on?
Party structure
The party’s structure may have aided the leadership in pushing for and staying in coalition while also binding in
the membership. While famed for having a complex and democratic structure, the Liberal Democrats have in the
last ten years adopted more of a top-down style that has strengthened the position of the leadership. This
allowed a leadership that came from the more economically liberal side of the party (sometimes referred to as
‘Orangebookers’) to sign-up to a coalition with the Conservative party, a party they were not as ideologically
hostile to as others in the party.
However, as an explanation this can only go so far. The democratic structure of the party meant the party’s
members had to vote for the coalition (in comparison with the Conservatives who gave their members and MPs
almost no say). A special conference, held only a few days after entering into the coalition, registered little
disagreement with the idea. Was the party signing up for a done-deal given this vote happened after the coalition
had been initially agreed and entered into? Not quite, the party having begun to prepare for such a vote when it
still seemed possible that a coalition with Labour might happen or the Conservatives might form a minority
government. The party’s leadership and membership also had few other choices. Refusing to enter a coalition
could have triggered another election, one the party could ill afford or which guaranteed a better result than that
just achieved. The limited dissent shown at the conference bound the party to the leadership in an act of
collective responsibility. Ditching Clegg would have led to the party being accused of trying to deflect blame.
Adding to this was the trauma left from losing both Kennedy and Campbell. Losing yet another leader would
have made the party look impossible to lead.
This does not mean dissent was not heard, the party’s structures and famously rebellious conferences allowed
those uneasy with the coalition to vent their feelings. The large number of Liberal Democrat peers, a large
number of whom often rebelled, provided another avenue. But these were internal, lacked much unity and were
rarely heard by the public. The resignation from the party of a large number of members opposed to the coalition
limited the strength of opposition or the potential for a split. The conviction of Chris Huhne, the man who in 2007
ran against Clegg for the leadership, removed the most viable alternative leader. An attempted leadership
challenge in 2014 fell apart in its early stages.
Inexperience
The Liberal Democrats often seemed to muddle through in government. Their ministerial team – which was
almost half of the Commons party, meaning many MPs were bound into the government ‘payroll vote’ – were
spread too thinly across government. The party itself was left in a weakened position to assist, it having
experienced a sharp decline in funding and staff. A 2012 review by the Social Liberal Forum concluded that the
party had been left unable to think of and put together new policy. The party might have prepared for a hung-
parliament and coalition negotiations, but it was not so well prepared for being in government. Learning and
coping therefore became the priority.
Philosophy
Muddling through would not have been sustained were it not for a deep-seated commitment – one central to
Liberal Democrat beliefs – that coalition government is the future, especially if a more proportional electoral
system were brought in for the Commons. Showing that coalition government was possible was one of the
positive outcomes some in the party believed would be achieved by entering into a coalition. It would be a
sacrifice, they believed, that in the long-run would change British politics in the way the Liberal Democrats
success from the 1970s onwards had helped break the mould of two-party politics
The party had also done nothing but exercise power in coalitions and in more consensual political systems. It
had been in coalition in Scotland and frequently in local government. It had held the balance of power in the
House of Lords. Its MEPs were noted for being amongst the most adept performers in the Liberal group of the
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European Parliament where the group held the balance of power. The party’s structures also made for an
outlook that believed in consensus and negotiation as opposed to single-party majoritarian rule.
It would not have passed unnoticed for the party’s leadership in the Commons that their colleagues in almost
every other domain of UK politics were exercising power. They on the other hand seemed doomed to be locked
out of UK government by the Commons two-party system. Adding to this was frustration in 2010 at seeing the
party increase its share of the vote from 18.3 per cent to 23 per cent only to end up losing several seats.
Determined to take the opportunity to show that the Commons party was more than a party of protest forever
locked out of government, its leadership took it into the coalition thanks to a mixture of personal ambition, a
determination to show the party could deliver, and to bring about a wider change to British politics.
Optimism
The coalition’s honeymoon period might have led some to believe that British politics had indeed changed
radically. The Liberal Democrats seemed to do very well in the coalition agreement. While public support for the
party soon dropped to a level from which it has not recovered, the party could console itself with the thought that
some of its key ideas were being delivered on and that, with time, they would see support grow as this was
recognised. Commitments such as electoral reform and reform of the House of Lords could also cushion the
party against drops in support. Bringing down the coalition early would have deprived the party of the chance to
deliver on these promises and reap any rewards from entering government. So it was that the first period of the
coalition, up until the Alternative Vote referendum in 2011, was marked by a more optimistic outlook and
cooperation with the Conservative party. By the time some key proposals had failed to materialise, and with
relations with the Conservatives now strained, the party found itself too far gone to back out. The party might well
have helped restrain the right wing of the Conservative party, but a moderating role was never recognised by the
public as something worth voting for.
So why then did the party not panic later on? In part enough MPs felt that even if the party was in trouble, they
themselves were safe in their individual seats. The party is famed for digging in and holding what look like
unwinnable seats in the first place. Polling that showed support holding up in local areas as opposed to the
national level might have provided a false sense of comfort from which some MPs awoke too late. The party also
has an in-built sense of optimism born from facing many dark days of low levels of support, of often being written
off, belittled and ignored. During the coalition the party has entered its darkest ever period, but the party has not
been able to shake off a sense that it can and will once again recover.
Constraints of government
Deposing of Nick Clegg would, like the Conservative Party getting rid of David Cameron, not only have entailed
removing the leader of a party, but changing one of the leaders of Her Majesty’s Government. This is not simply
about the higher level and national ramifications involved. The institutions of government often limit what the
partners in a coalition can and cannot do. The processes of government, aided by a unified civil service that
seeks to serve a coherent executive, bind the leaderships of the parties together through meetings, minutes and
shared experiences. According to some memoirs and comments in the press, personal and working relations,
while sometimes stormy, were more harmonious than many in either party had expected. This was bolstered by
the two leaderships sharing an ideological outlook on some issues, not least that of cutting the budget deficit.
Last, but certainly not least, was the effect of the fixed term parliament act. Even if the party had dropped out of
the coalition, the Conservatives could have continued to govern as a minority government unless the Commons
voted to trigger an early election. At no time did polling put the Liberal Democrats in a position to benefit from
such a move. Discipline within the party was therefore helped by a sense that it was better to see the coalition
through to the end in the hope something would turn up to improve the party’s standing.
Marching onwards
The party that broke the mould of two-party politics may find on May 7 that they have broken their back in going
one further in trying to break the mould of single-party government. The party will survive, and could enter into
coalition government again at some point given that for the foreseeable future it looks unlikely that any one party
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will secure an overall majority. Coalition government, its formation and its durability will therefore be a subject of
much discussion and analysis. In studying the Liberal Democrats experiences in this coalition it will be important
not simply to ask why they entered into coalition or what they achieved, but how it was that they helped deliver
something many thought was impossible: a coalition government that lasted the course.
Disclaimer: Between 2007-2009 Tim Oliver worked in the Liberal Democrats Whips’ Office in the House of Lords.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of
the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.  
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